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ABSTRACT
This paper seeks to explore the impacts of peacekeeping operations by the United
Nations on the human rights abuses associated with civil wars. Previous research has consistently
found evidence that civil wars increase human rights abuses; however, the literature has not
adequately analyzed possible factors that could decrease this violence or the affects
peacekeeping could have on human rights performances. The UN has four types of peacekeeping
operations: observer, traditional, multidimensional, and enforcement. The results of a Heckman
selection model for 57 countries that have experienced a civil war between 1976 and 2012
suggest peacekeeping does impact human rights performances, although the impact is dissimilar
for different types of missions and different types of human rights. In comparing mission
effectiveness, multidimensional missions decrease human rights abuses more than
observer/traditional missions and enforcement missions for current and future rights.
Enforcement missions are associated with more abuses for current rights in comparison to
traditional missions, but have fewer abuses five years in the future. Differences in time lags also
suggest that the larger multidimensional and enforcement missions are more effective for future
rights, whereas smaller traditional missions can be sufficient in impacting current human rights
performances. These inferences apply to physical integrity rights, though, as the different
mission types do not seem to affect civil liberty rights using the selection model.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the past few decades, the fields of human rights and peacekeeping have evolved and
expanded into important issues and areas of study across both the international system and
political science literature. Helping these two fields to prominence, the United Nations (UN)
began the fight for peace and freedom at its inception in 1945 when it required all members to
sign its Charter, pledging to promote and encourage “respect for human rights and for
fundamental freedoms for all” (“Chapter I,” 1945). Three years later the General Assembly
adopted into force the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to explicitly describe the
fundamental freedoms of all human beings to which the international community should aspire
to uphold. That same year the Security Council authorized the deployment of the United Nations
Truce Supervision Organization to monitor the Armistice Agreement between Israel and its
neighbors in the Middle East. Since then, the UN has deployed 69 peacekeeping operations with
hundreds of thousands of personnel from more than 120 contributing countries (“History of
Peacekeeping,” n.d.). Using the foundations for international human rights laws as laid out in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the UN has also adopted into force nine human rights
treaties, with all 193 UN members a voluntary party to at least one.
However, it was not until decades after the UN introduced human rights and
peacekeeping operations as internationally important multilateral issues that they gained
prominence in the international system. In the 1970s human rights issues evolved into
transnational movements in response to the publicized abuses of authoritarian regimes and the
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introduction of human rights concerns in a rising number of countries’ foreign policies. The
burgeoning issue of human rights permeated political science literature in an attempt to explain
behavioral variation across states with empirical analysis. The number of studies regarding
human rights expanded dramatically following the Cold War and a continuing wave of
democratization that diffused and ingrained the growing human rights movement into an
international effort (Cardenas, 2009). Peacekeeping operations are largely referred to as “the
deployment of international personnel to help maintain peace and security” (Fortna and Howard,
2008) and also gained in notoriety around the same time. Before 1989 peacekeeping was largely
used in interstate conflicts, and the primary purpose of the few intrastate missions was to contain
civil conflict in the hopes of preventing direct involvement by superpowers or to aid
decolonization (Fortna, 2008). After the Cold War and end of the deadlock in the Security
Council between the United States and Soviet Union, the amount of peacekeeping operations
increased dramatically and the main purpose of the operations progressed into preventing the
resumption of war. The end of the Cold War also brought a change in the peacekeeping
literature. The few early studies focused on case histories and limited testing on interstate
conflict. The amount of scholarly work increased with the number of missions after the Cold
War and turned from optimistic pieces into case studies analyzing the failures and limitations of
well-publicized fiascos. At the beginning of this century, the UN renewed its efforts at
peacekeeping with the 2000 Brahimi Report and the international community renewed its
positive view of the missions. Peacekeeping literature additionally changed, with more focus on
rigorous quantitative testing to examine whether peacekeeping empirically impacts the likelihood
and duration of peace during and after civil wars (Fortna and Howard, 2008).

2

Unfortunately, some of the most notorious United Nations peacekeeping operations are
associated with egregious human rights abuses. The UN operation in Somalia withdrew from the
country almost twenty years ago, leaving Somalis in the midst of a brutal power struggle
between the government and multiple clans fighting for control. This left innocent civilians to
encounter indiscriminant fire in the capital and abusive and arbitrary law in opposition-controlled
territories. The true extent of destruction to the population is unknown, but all parties to the
conflict have been accused of war crimes (“Somalia,” 2010). After this publicized failure, the
United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda failed to stop the 100 days-long massacre of an
estimated 800,000 people (“Rwanda,” 2011). One year later, the United Nations Protection Force
in Bosnia failed to stop the culmination of a Serbian ethnic cleansing campaign in Srebrenica
where the Army of the Bosnian Serb Republic killed and mutilated an estimated 7,800 Muslim
males of all ages (Smith, n.d.). These and other well-publicized fiascos have called into question
the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations to secure lasting peace and protect innocent
civilians.
Less publicized missions, though, have helped to secure the end of conflicts, foster
reconciliation to prevent a resurgence of war, and aided in curbing violence. The UN operation
in Liberia helped manage the disarmament and demobilization of former combatants and helped
other UN and international agencies to restore basic services to the population. The mission also
implemented a series of humanitarian projects, including sending the first all-female unit of
peacekeepers who were uniquely positioned to help the regularly targeted female war victims.
The operation not only increased the number of women coming forward to report gender-based
violence but further lowered the country’s overall crime rate (“UN Peacekeeping is a Success in
Liberia,” n.d.). The United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala helped demobilize the
3

Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) by overseeing the separation of forces
between the Guatemalan Army and URNG and collecting URNG weapons and military
equipment to ensure the process of reintegration by former combatants. It also assisted in
numerous peacebuilding projects that reinforced the decline in political violence, including
organizing human rights and judicial training programs by experts and installing an easy to use
database for documenting abuses (“Missions Coming Down,” 2004). The United Nations
Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) helped implement the Lomé Peace Agreement by
disarming over 75,000 ex-combatants and assisting in holding the country’s first free and fair
national elections. UNAMSIL was vital in instituting a war crimes tribunal and the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission. The operation additionally helped the government end illegal
diamond trading, which had fueled the conflict by giving rebels money to buy weapons, and
worked with other UN agencies to generate jobs for unemployed youth and former fighters
(“Sierra Leone,” n.d.). While missions viewed as successful are not as notorious as failed
missions, the UN has indeed managed to positively impact states involved in the destructive
violence of war and its chaotic aftermath.
With the continued prevalence of human rights abuses in the international system,
especially in relation to civil wars, I want to identify whether peacekeeping is one factor that can
limit the number of abuses committed by states. In light of the mixed record for perceived
successes and failures, I specifically want to analyze the impact of different types of United
Nations peacekeeping operations to identify which type is most effective in limiting abuses.
There are four types of peacekeeping operations, although I combine two to form three groups.
Observer and traditional missions are consent-based and are deployed to monitor and report
compliance with cease-fire or war termination agreements. Multidimensional missions have
4

larger scopes and consist of both military and civilian personnel in order to engage in
peacebuilding. Finally, enforcement missions consist of substantially more soldiers with the
ability to use force in order to guarantee compliance with cease-fire/settlement agreements and to
provide security (Fortna, 2008, p. 7). To test the different impacts of these three groups of
peacekeeping operations on states’ human rights performances, I use panel data from 1976 to
2012 for 57 countries. Because the UN does not send peacekeepers to every state involved in a
civil war, I utilize a Heckman statistical model to test current and future impacts on human rights
to account for selection bias in the Security Council’s decision to approve a mission. This model
is also important as previous scholars argue UN missions are sent to the “harder” conflicts;
therefore, abstaining from using a two-stage selection model could potentially underestimate the
positive impacts of peacekeepers in relation to civil wars that do not experience peacekeeping.
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II. HUMAN RIGHTS AND PEACEKEEPING
One of the most consistent findings in the human rights literature is the positive
relationship between human rights abuses and civil war (Poe and Tate, 1994; Krain, 1997; Keith,
1999; Poe, Tate, and Keith, 1999; Zanger, 2000; Keith, 2002; Davenport and Armstrong, 2004;
Bueno de Mesquita, Cherif, Downs, and Smith, 2005; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, 2005; Murdie
and Davis, 2012). Political restrictions, torture, unlawful imprisonment, politically-motivated
murder, and censorship are all methods employed by governments wishing to “neutralize
political opponents” or rebel leaders and increase the costs of resistance “to such a large extent
that it is no longer deemed a worthwhile strategy” (Davenport, 1995). While conflict of any kind
would logically seem to coincide with rights abuses, international war does not share as strong or
as significant a relationship with respect for human rights as civil war. The first study to test the
link between human rights abuses and international and civil war is Poe and Tate (1994). They
argue governments can impose restrictions and violence on citizens to combat internal threats to
their authority and rule. They hypothesize states are more coercive when challenged by an armed
and organized resistance, and using four measures of physical integrity rights they find civil wars
to significantly and substantially increase the propensity to engage in repression. Poe, Tate, and
Keith (1999) expanded this analysis to include a larger time frame, 1976 to 1993, and argue that
the most extensive factor causing leaders to resort to repression is the existence of internal or
international threats in the form of war. Their findings largely confirmed the results from the
1994 study, although the effects of international war are slightly smaller and the effects of civil
war slightly larger.
6

Numerous other studies have since corroborated the strong relationship between human
rights abuses and civil war, although they continue to analyze this indicator as a control variable
and not as a main independent variable. Examining regime change, Zanger (2000) argues that
“civil war presents the most serious and most violent domestic threat to elites in power,” who are
likely to resort to the use of violence against domestic opponents (p. 223). She finds civil war to
consistently be highly significant and international war to be less significant with regard to
personal integrity rights between 1976 and 1993. Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui (2005) analyze the
impact of treaties on human rights performance and find civil war to be highly significant and
negatively associated with personal integrity rights for 153 states in the same time period as
Zanger, while international war has no effect. They argue governments “tend to be more
coercive, defending their authority against internal challenges” (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui,
2005, p. 1388). Neumayer (2005) produces a similar study and additionally finds civil war to
strongly affect both personal integrity rights using the Political Terror Scales and civil rights as
measured by Freedom House, while international war is again largely insignificant. In the
seminal study by Davenport and Armstrong (2004), in which they challenge the negative and
linear relationship between democracy and personal integrity rights violations, civil war is again
highly significant while international war is less significant with a much smaller effect for 147
countries between 1976 and 1996. Murdie and Davis (2012) assess the impact of ‘shaming’ by
international human rights organizations on targeted states’ human rights performance and argue
civil wars can initiate instances where repression is utilized to “prevent coop attempts, temper
opposition, and can even be condoned for security reasons” (p. 7). They find intra-state wars to
be significantly and negatively associated with the CIRI Physical Integrity Rights Index for 130
states between 1992 and 2004. Although these are but a few examples of empirical studies
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including an indicator for civil war, they do demonstrate the variety within the human rights
literature as to the different statistical models, measures of human rights performances, and
independent variables of interest that continue to verify this prominent finding. These examples
also demonstrate a lack of thorough theoretical explanations for why states have empirically
abused citizens’ rights, and an even greater lack of explanations for why other parties to the civil
war might violate the public’s rights.
In contrast to the consistent and highly statistically significant relationship between
human rights abuses and civil war, findings relating to the success or influence of peacekeeping
are varied. The peacekeeping literature is largely concerned with the success or failure of
peacekeeping operations, with the definition of “success” debated. Success is largely argued to
mean one of three things: the mission fulfilled its mandate, the mission ended the conflict in
which it intervened, or the mission enabled peace to endure longer post-conflict.
Recent studies, though, emphasize the selection effect of peacekeeping missions, and
argue that this can potentially bias the success rate of these missions due to the propensity to get
involved in more ‘difficult’ cases. Examining the post-Cold War era, Gilligan and Stedman
(2003) find the UN is most likely to intervene the more severe a conflict, as measured by the
amount of deaths, and the longer the duration of the war. They also found UN peacekeeping
operations are less likely to be deployed to intrastate wars where there are large government
armies. Fortna (2004) finds consent-based UN peacekeepers are more likely to be deployed after
stalemates than wars that end in a decisive victory for one side, whereas the relationships are
insignificant for enforcement operations. She also finds peacekeepers are not more likely to
intervene in conflicts where a formal treaty has been signed, where there are identity conflicts, or
with a large number of deaths. Fortna (2008) additionally finds UN consent-based Chapter VI
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missions are more likely to intervene in countries with lower living standards, relatively strong
rebel groups, smaller government armies, and rougher terrain. Enforcement-based Chapter VII
missions “are more likely in less democratic states, where levels of mistrust are higher, and
where there are multiple factions” (Fortna, 2008, p. 45). Also analyzing the post-Cold War era,
Hultman (2013) finds the number of civilians killed increases the likelihood of UN peace
operations, especially when civilians are specifically targeted, as well as the likelihood that the
Security Council provides a more robust mandate and the use of force. Finally, Mullenbach
(2005) contrasts the other findings by suggesting international-level factors impact the decisions
to deploy peacekeeping missions more than state-level factors. Even though some of his results
correlate with previously mentioned studies, he finds previous interaction and intervention by
IGOs or global or regional powers to be some of the strongest influences on deployments,
especially regarding UN peacekeeping. With this selection bias in mind, recent studies have been
able to more aptly test the effectiveness of peacekeeping.
On the question of peacekeeping success, quantitative analysis generally finds
peacekeeping to help maintain peace after civil wars. Analyzing post-WWII civil wars, Doyle
and Sambanis (2000) conclude peacekeeping operations are most successful at maintaining
durable peace when missions have the appropriate capabilities and scope to help with
institutional and political reform in the form of elections and democratization. Fortna (2004;
2008) concludes peacekeeping significantly drops the risk of another round of fighting,
especially after the Cold War and with consent-based missions. Using matching techniques,
Gilligan and Sergenti (2008) find UN peacekeeping is strongly and significantly related to longer
post-war peace, although it is insignificant in shortening ongoing wars. Madhav (2013) argues
UN missions indirectly contribute to durable peace by incorporating former rivals into the
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“institutional setup of the postwar state” and ensuring rivals have a way to resolve their
differences without violence (p. 366). Analyzing post-WWII civil wars, he finds UN operations
are positively and significantly associated with the democratic process, which in turn positively
impacts post-war peacebuilding. However, not all studies echo these positive results. Greig and
Diehl (2005) argue peacekeeping can actually discourage conflict settlement and find there are
no significant positive impacts on peace agreements, although the results are much more
negative for interstate wars than civil wars. Sambanis (2008) finds UN peacekeeping only has
short term effects on the durability of post-war settlements and political openness. He argues UN
missions do not foster the economic growth required to sustain peace in the long term. The
peacekeeping literature in general, though, views peacekeeping operations as effectively
increasing the duration of peace after civil wars. However, it does not explore the relationship
between peacekeeping operations and the propensity of civil war actors to engage in human
rights abuses.
Only one study specifically tries to combine these two fields. Murdie and Davis (2010)
analyze the impact of peacekeeping on states’ human rights abuses after civil wars. They test all
states with a history of at least one civil war in the past ten years for the time period 1980 to
2004. They broadly define a peacekeeping intervention as “any intervention by an outside state
or international organization into the internal affairs of a state with the goal of preventing a
resumption of military hostilities or to provide an environment where negotiations can occur”
(Murdie and Davis, 2010, p. 50). Using four measures of human rights abuses as their dependent
variables, they find the mere presence of a peacekeeping intervention does not have any
significant relationship with change in a state’s human rights performance. Missions that include
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a humanitarian purpose, though, positively impact human rights performances for three years in
the future, but not the present, and negatively impact future empowerment rights.
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III. COMPARING MISSIONS’ ABILITIES TO REDUCE HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES
“It can be argued that the exercise of force by a state is directly related to the magnitude
of the opposition to its regime” (Aflatooni and Allen, 1991, p. 29). If one of the largest threats to
governments consists of violent strategies of dissent (Davenport, 1995, p. 687), then opposition
groups forcing the state into a civil war is one of the greatest challenges to political systems. For
opposition groups to challenge the government enough to classify the country as experiencing a
‘civil war,’ it means they have (even minimally) effective power, military capabilities, and/or
public support. Otherwise, the government would prevent dissidents from escalading to the
ultimate form of internal conflict. In response to this ‘magnitude’ of oppositional threat to their
rule, government leaders can resort to physical and civil human rights violations to weaken their
opponents’ capabilities. Failing to respond to serious dissent can lessen the state’s ability to
extract resources from its territory and citizens, protect itself, effectively use its military, or
continue to execute its day-to-day tasks (Krain, 1997, p. 335). Leaders could also be responding
to citizens’ demands for violent action to neutralize dissident combatants if the groups are
viewed as dangerous towards the public (Davenport, 1995, p. 687). Politically weak and
centralized states might use violence against citizens to quell rebel movements due to the
inability of weak, inept, or corrupt local police or military to disband violent opposition groups,
especially in periphery territories with limited administrative control (Fearon and Laitin, 2003, p.
75-76). Violent reaction to stop and deter rebels might be the only feasible option to financially
or administratively weak officials, when they deem the relative cost of losing office or conceding
to rebel demands too high. Moreover, under weak officials, unrestrained military and police units
12

can carry out their own abuses against citizens or react more harshly to opposition groups than
intended by state leaders.
In using repression to quell dissidents, governments can violate both physical integrity
rights and civil liberty rights. To directly weaken the opposition, officials can use military or
police forces to physically find rebels and torture, unlawfully detain, or execute them. Torturing
can be used to extract strategic information or to deter further involvement in rebel groups.
Violating citizens’ rights to due process can be used to hold rebels or suspected rebel supporters
in secure locations to ensure they are unable to participate in their group’s activities. Killing
opponents and suspected supporters is the ultimate act to ensure threatening combatants are
unable to challenge the regime, and acts as a deterrent to others by substantially raising the cost
of dissenting. The government could also engage in mass killings to eradicate rebel hierarchies
simply because they are unsure of who is part of the opposition. Officials can additionally resort
to harming civilians in order to directly destroy or weaken a rebel group’s support base, or to
undermine the legitimacy of rebel groups by demonstrating that they cannot protect the public
and would thus be an inadequate replacement for current leaders (Krain, 2005, p. 370). In
addition to physical violations, political elites can respond to threats by abusing the public’s civil
liberties. Officials can restrict political access and participation to keep opponents from gaining
access to government offices. Moreover, they can restrict the freedom of speech, assembly and
association, or expression and beliefs to prevent the messages and ideals of rebel groups from
spreading to the mass public and inciting larger oppositional support. Elites could further control
the flow of information by restricting news sources. In order to economically weaken rebel
groups, political officials can restrict workers’ rights, trade unions, equality of the sexes, and
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economic activity. All of these methods can be employed to help the incumbent government
retain control over its citizens and state apparatuses.
Rebels additionally have incentives to engage in violence. Rebel groups typically have
fewer resources than the government, due to less access to collecting rents, taxes, and orienting
the economy in a way that benefits them. Also, groups rebel because they feel they are not
benefiting enough from the status quo. If combatants are fighting to gain a greater share of
economic benefits or in response to insufficiently compensated work (Ross, 2004, p. 41), then it
most likely means they are not doing as well financially as they deem fair and thus have less
resources to challenge the government. Therefore, to substantially challenge the government,
rebel groups can resort to guerrilla tactics, which can indiscriminately harm everyone in the
surrounding area. They might resort to physical violence against civilians in order to deter those
who may fight against them or to frighten those who are not participating in anti-system behavior
to join the rebel organization (Davenport, 1995, p. 687). Moreover, they could use violence to
disrupt the provision of public goods or to demonstrate the government’s inability to protect its
citizens in order to dissuade the population from supporting the state’s regime (Wood, Kathman,
and Gent, 2012, p. 648). When low on resources, guerrilla tactics and targeting unarmed civilians
are relatively low-cost mechanisms with potentially high payoffs in gaining attention and
demonstrating abilities or resolve to the government. These mechanisms are especially costeffective when rebels do not have the capacity to directly fight military or police forces. In
addition, rebels may not have access to the intelligence technology of the government, so they
may resort to torture in order to acquire information. Violent opposition groups can not only kill,
torture, or kidnap civilians, but they can also impede on the public’s civil rights. Although
opposition groups cannot legally impinge on citizens’ rights since they are not officially
14

members of the government, they can use violence to frighten the public from exercising their
rights to free speech, assembly, equality, or government participation. Finally, wars are violent
by nature, and that violence is seldom limited to armed combatants. Each side is trying to destroy
the other by any means necessary in order to fulfill its goals, whether it be replacing the
incumbent government, gaining autonomy over a territory, forcing policy changes, or retaining
power.
The potential for violence and restrictions does not always end with the cessation of war.
Without adequate compromises, implementation, or guarantees, war-ending agreements can fail
and the country can dissolve back into war with all the abuses inherently associated with it.
Unsatisfied parties and the absence of third-party intervention can also leave the public, former
combatants, and government-affiliated personnel susceptible to retaliatory abuses. The
incumbent or new government leaders can physically harm former members or supporters of
opposition groups in anger over devastation suffered during the war and to deter future uprisings.
In addition, the government can restrict civil liberties for the same purposes, or to ensure the
public at large or specific groups remain economically and politically weak to prevent future
threats. Rebel groups who feel they did not fully receive their deserved goals may violently lash
out to demonstrate their contempt for the agreement or to cause a peace agreement to fail.
Previous literature is clear about this relationship between human rights abuses and civil
wars, but it is unclear about how peacekeeping operations can impact it. There is also
disagreement in the literature about which components of peacekeeping are the most essential in
maintaining peace. Being that previous literature found civil wars to significantly and
substantially affect human rights performance more than international wars, this paper seeks to
compare the three groups of UN peacekeeping operations and their ability to decrease the human
15

rights abuses associated with civil wars. First, observer and traditional missions act as a conduit
of credible information to both sides of a conflict and to the international system. The
peacekeepers allow belligerents to credibly signal information to the opposing side without
resorting to human rights abuses. Peacekeepers also report their observances to the international
community, which can then “shame and blame” belligerents into using avenues other than
violence to achieve their goals. Second, multidimensional missions can decrease the amount of
abuses committed more than the previous group since they go beyond monitoring and reporting
to implementing peacebuilding components. These missions include substantial civilian elements
to ensure representation by opposing parties in the post-war state structure and aid in
implementing a more non-violent system. Multidimensional missions additionally put more
direct effort into humanitarian aims. Third, enforcement missions help to physically ensure
security for fighting factions and civilians and deter abusive behavior with the threat of force.
All UN peacekeeping operations entail monitoring the implementation of the country’s
cease-fire agreement and reporting on the adherence of the agreement by all fighting factions.
The mandates of observer missions do not go beyond monitoring and reporting. Traditional
missions can include the creation of buffer zones, mine clearance, minor military or police
training, facilitating the withdrawal of foreign troops or refugees, and facilitating humanitarian
aid programs. Both observer and traditional missions are generally only lightly armed, with strict
instructions to refrain from using force other than in self-defense. They also generally have
consent from all warring factions and attempt to remain unbiased toward any particular party.
Through consent and neutrality, international attention, and other non-military mechanisms,
these types of peacekeeping missions reduce the amount of human rights abuses associated with
civil war by facilitating credible information between belligerents and encouraging non-violent
16

behavior. However, these missions typically have the least amount of personnel, financial
support, and mandate expansiveness, which could limit the ability to quickly and decisively end
hostilities in a manner conducive to future respect for human rights.
Observer and traditional missions place more emphasis on obtaining consent from
warring parties and maintaining neutrality than multidimensional and enforcement missions.
Consent by all parties in a civil war for the UN to establish a mission in-country is important
because it signals the warring factions have at least some desire for peace and some desire to
carry out their cease-fire agreement, at least for the near future. By agreeing to be monitored by a
third-party as international as the United Nations, warring factions know they are involving
themselves in an organization that is not only important in recognizing the legitimate rulers of a
state but also one that holds a lot of international attention. For the other types of peacekeeping
operations, consent is not always given by all belligerents. If a faction does not consent to the
operation, it indicates they believe the operation will harm their chances of reaching their goals.
Therefore, non-consenting parties would be more likely to continue or increase violent behavior
in an attempt to undermine the operation (Diehl, 1988, p. 503). Additionally, consent allows
peacekeepers to gather more information about the war situation and the actions and motivations
of each group. Howard (2008) argues consent can “be a precondition for learning,” and increases
the abilities of peacekeepers to collect and disperse information by being able to interact with
local populations and members of each faction (p. 328). Neutrality is also significant because it
facilitates the continuation of consent for the mission. If the operation is perceived as biased
toward one side, other parties may not want to continue cooperating since it might hinder their
ability to gain or retain power. Other states may also disagree with the biased party chosen to
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help win the conflict, and consequently might withdraw resources or counteract the mission by
sending their own oppositional support.
Peacekeeping operations are important because they allow for a less-violent alternative
for the transmission of credible information. Because warring groups in a civil war are all
working to achieve a different goal, information is difficult to gather and send because of the
strategic incentives to remain secretive and misrepresent. It is not advantageous for any group to
reveal any or all of its true intentions, motivations, resources/capabilities, bases, supporters,
resolve, or costs. Therefore, combatants may resort to the use of torture, unlawful detention,
murder, mutilation, or other physical integrity abuses to force individuals to reveal credible
information. Sending information through credible signals is also difficult due to the incentive to
misrepresent. Peacekeepers reduce information asymmetries by transmitting intelligence
between groups without the use of violence. Since peacekeepers are part of a multinational
organization committed to securing world peace, belligerents can be more trusting of information
relayed through them concerning other parties. The neutrality of observational and traditional
missions also makes the information relayed more credible since there is no incentive for
peacekeepers to misrepresent or withhold vital information from cease-fire implementations. UN
peacekeepers strive to remain neutral and truthful so that they will not compromise future
missions or the willingness of future combatants to consent to interventions. By closely
monitoring the actions of each group, peacekeepers can confirm and reassure that all groups are
genuinely trying to fulfill the directives of cease-fire agreements. This, at the very least, makes it
harder for any group to launch a surprise attack, stockpile resources for later attacks, or renege
on other aspects of the agreement. Therefore, belligerents can at least lessen the naturally
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mistrustful nature of war by sending and receiving signals and information through peacekeepers
instead of resorting to physical integrity abuses.
The international attention that accompanies UN operations can further reduce rights
abuses by deterring belligerents from using violence and by preventing unintentional escalations
of violence. Peacekeepers report noncompliance to an agreement and any violence carried out by
each faction. Parties to a conflict are generally dependent upon some form of foreign aid or
foreign resources. Using violence could put future aid in jeopardy, especially since other
organizations are generally more willing to give resources to conflicts that have peacekeepers on
the ground for assistance (Fortna, 2008, p. 90-92). Moreover, abusive behavior could result in
sanctions, which could economically hurt belligerents resulting in less available resources. The
UN can additionally maintain the legitimacy of the government or grant legitimacy to rebel
groups. Committing violent acts, especially towards the civilian population, could result in the
loss of a group’s legitimate power to the international community, which could affect how
legitimately they are viewed by the domestic population. This is especially important to rebel
groups who are fighting for control of the government or if either side has an incentive to win
future elections (Ibid.). In addition to reporting actions to the international community,
peacekeepers can help prevent unnecessary violence through retaliation or misunderstandings.
Instead of having to choose between retaliation and looking weak, a group can respond to attacks
by reporting the incident to peacekeepers who can then relay the information to the international
community. Furthermore, by facilitating a credible flow of information, peacekeepers can
prevent misunderstandings from escalading into abusive behavior (Ibid., p. 94-95).
Despite these positive influences that observer and traditional missions can impart on
parties to a civil war, the missions lack the mandate scopes and resources of multidimensional
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and enforcement missions. As previously stated, observer and traditional missions are not
authorized to physically protect local populations from violence or ensure their civil and political
rights are respected. They must simply monitor and report the treatment of civilians, not
interfere. Even if peacekeepers on the ground wanted to interfere, these missions typically have
limited resources. Compared to multidimensional and enforcement missions, they have
significantly less military and civilian personnel and budgets, which impedes their ability to
physically reach all conflict areas in a nation or all areas instantaneously. These limits confine
peacekeepers’ abilities to effectively deter warring factions from using violence. Furthermore,
these limitations can provoke warring factions into using more violence. Authorizing observer or
traditional missions in lieu of the other two types can be a signal to combatants that the UN has a
weak resolve for the conflict and/or that they are not prepared to risk resources for protecting
civilians (Hultman, Kathman, Shannon, 2013a, p. 880), which could decrease the effectiveness
of ‘shaming and blaming’ reports of abuses to the international community. Seeing peacekeepers
could also give civilians an unrealistic sense-of-security and lead to them wandering out of safety
to become targets to combatants who feel limited pressure to avoid attacking civilians. In
addition, if warring factions have reason to believe the Security Council will authorize one of the
other two larger mission types in the future, government or rebel fighters could carry out
violence in the urgent need to “secure civilian loyalty, deter civilian defection, restock their
fighting ranks, and acquire more resources” before more peacekeeping personnel arrive to
solidify an unfavorable status quo (Ibid., p. 881). Alternatively, combatants could conclude that
the international community has low resolve for ending their conflict and respond to a
heightened future security dilemma by committing mass abuses to secure resources and support
for a resurgence of warfare when the peace agreement fails (Kathman and Wood, 2012, p 19).
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The neutrality of these missions can also hinder their effectiveness by taking longer to
resolve the issues in dispute. To remain impartial, observer/traditional operations must refrain
from supporting one side or the other. Therefore, wars with neutral interveners have been argued
to last longer and been found to be less likely to remain settled due to the fact that they do not
‘tip the balance’ with military weapons or soldiers and help one side to victory (Toft 2010;
Regan 2002). Quick and decisive victories can create more stable and lasting peace as compared
to negotiated settlements due to the destruction of the enemy, or at least a credible threat of harm
if the opposition reneges with violence, and by effectively demonstrating the capabilities of each
side (Toft, 2010, p. 33-34). Negotiated settlements do not always clarify which side would have
won the conflict, which could lead to a lapse back into fighting for the side that feels thwarted by
the peace agreement. Although decisive military victories can lead to human rights violations
post-conflict through revenge violence to the opposition or to quell resistance to the outcome, not
to mention abuses that occur through defeating all opponents, they can also prevent future
violations that occur from a resumption of hostilities. Conversely, negotiated settlements may
prevent abuses in the short term with peace agreements but may not in the long term if fighting
resumes. On the contrary, it can be argued that the longer wars of negotiated settlements create
environments more conducive to stable peace and respect for human rights through information
convergence and war weariness. Through repeated confrontation, all sides to a conflict slowly
gain information on their opponents and eventually converge on the knowledge of each group’s
capabilities and resolve, which leads to a cessation of hostilities because each side knows who
will win. Long durations of violence can also leave all parties weary to more violence, thus
decreasing prospects for human rights violations in the future.
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Even though observer and traditional missions are mainly focused on simply monitoring
and reporting events instead of militarily forcing belligerents to comply with cease-fire
agreements or engaging in better human rights practices, they can still be effective in deterring
abusive behavior through transparency and raising the costs of violence. States left on their own
do not have the same conduit of credible information or the same incentives to discontinue or
lessen abusive behavior. These impacts, though, can be overshadowed by insufficient mandate
scopes and resources and the ability to quickly and decisively end hostilities. Therefore, I expect
there will be no significant impact with reducing current human rights abuses as compared to the
other two types. I also do not expect traditional missions to impact future human rights
performances because any deterring impact will occur while peacekeeping personnel are still on
the ground and will cease once the international community has deemed that the conflict is either
finished or not worth the cost of intervention. Furthermore, since the focus of these missions is
mainly concerned with implementing cease-fire agreements, I expect any statistical significance
to decrease physical integrity rights, but not necessarily civil liberty rights. Because personal
violence, such as murder and torture, is viewed as more horrific than civil liberty abuses, such as
restricting free speech, the international community is more forceful at preventing the former
over the latter. Therefore, combatants should be more reluctant to engage in physical integrity
abuses than civil liberty abuses for fear of an enlarged peacekeeping operation or negative
consequences in other aspects of the international community.
Multidimensional operations go beyond observer and traditional missions by including
peacebuilding measures. While they still continue to deter abusive behavior through monitoring
and reporting, multidimensional operations go a step further and attempt to build and change
state institutions to reinforce belligerents’ behavioral change and ensure better human rights
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performances for the post-conflict state. Multidimensional mandates can include: organizing and
supervising elections, investigating human rights abuses and/or holding trials for abusers,
judicial reform, delivering humanitarian assistance, repatriating refugees, military and police
training, security sector reform, social and economic recovery and development programs,
facilitating the creation of a stable government with democratic principles, or even temporarily
administering a territory (Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2003, p. 2). Not all missions
include the same mandates, but multidimensional missions generally include at least some
human rights aspects and/or state reconstruction toward democratization. Multidimensional
operations can decrease the amount of human rights abuses associated with civil wars not only
by deterring factions from engaging in abusive behavior, but by helping to build or restructure a
state’s system to better respect human rights.
In addition to facilitating a system conducive to protecting physical and civil rights, these
missions can help solve some of the problems that resulted in a civil war, thus facilitating an end
to civil war related abuses. After more than a hundred years of colonial rule, the United Nations
Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) for Namibia intensively worked to provide the country
with its first elections through: voter education, establishing polling stations, ballot-box
supervising to guard against fraudulent voting, policing electoral stations to keep voters safe,
organizing regular meetings of the leaders of all parties in the election (who had never before
convened) to create a political Code of Conduct, and helping to negotiate the release of political
prisoners and repatriate refugees for a comprehensive voter turnout. UNTAG even went so far as
to “neutralize” the old biased colonial newspaper and broadcasting systems prone to propaganda
perpetuating colonialism and apartheid and sent special missions to neighboring states to
physically track down missing Namibians and verify they were not being detained (“Namibia,”
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n.d.). By ensuring free and fair elections, peacekeepers can protect against unlawful political
exclusion and help to create a stable government with democratic values that incorporates all
groups into the post-civil war system. Power-sharing institutions can lessen security concerns by
ensuring each group is represented and in a position to influence future decisions of the state
(Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003). Political power-sharing can protect against one group gaining
enough power to abuse the rights of others and can act as a ‘check’ to prevent abusive policies
from evolving. Walter (1997) found institutional power-sharing arrangements are not only
crucial to long-term peace, especially in the absence of decisive military victories, but can also
offset limited security guarantees allowing the UN to facilitate peaceful conflict settlements
without having to get the Security Council to declare a Chapter VII and deploy a substantial
amount of troops (p. 361-362).
In conjunction to political power-sharing, military power-sharing and economic
restructuring can help combat abuses committed in the post-civil war state system. Military
power-sharing keeps one group from gaining enough power to abuse the rights of the other,
while forcing each group to work together and thus lessening the differences between the two
groups and the incentive to carry out violence against one another. By re-training and monitoring
unified military and police forces, peacekeepers can deter the use of torture, unlawful
imprisonment, forced disappearances, and murder (Fortna, 2008, p. 99-100). Reforming and
monitoring the judicial sector further helps lessen abusive behavior by ensuring abusers are
punished, which can deter potential abusers and retaliators from engaging in abusive behavior.
Moreover, an independent judiciary can ensure political officials maintain respect for citizens’
civil liberties and do not infringe on their abilities to express and exercise their beliefs.
Additionally, economic reconstruction might relieve some of the pressures that resulted in
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fighting by helping disadvantaged groups gain economic leverage within the system and can
make them less vulnerable to abusive behavior. The peacebuilding that is important in
multidimensional missions is intended to institute a structure conducive to peaceful conflict
resolution (Ibid., p. 101) and ensure no group in society is vulnerable to physical or civil
infringements.
Furthermore, multidimensional operations should have a greater impact on lessening
human rights abuses because they specifically include humanitarian objectives. The deterrence
associated with observer and traditional missions is greatly increased not only because there are
larger soldier and civilian components, but also because the missions are specifically searching
for abuses and actively trying to discourage abusive behavior. While observer and traditional
missions do report on human rights abuses, it is not always a focus. The focus for
observer/traditional missions is more on whether the sides are following the accords of the ceasefire agreement, and peacekeepers can even deem it harmful to the completion of the mission by
dwelling on human rights concerns. Missions with humanitarian objectives not only monitor
abuses but investigate complaints and give more detailed reports to the UN and the international
community that specifically focus on abusive actions. Restructuring of the government is also
carried out with humanitarian objectives in mind, especially with training soldiers and police to
respect human rights and ensuring the judicial system is active and ethical. Operations further
restructure the education system, as the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
(UNTAC) accomplished, by incorporating human rights studies into university curriculums and
providing education and expertise to teachers, health professionals, and public officials.
Moreover, UNTAC trained judges, defense lawyers, public defenders, justice officials, and
intensely monitored and investigated all prisoners suspected of politically motivated detention
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while pressuring authorities to improve their situation to the fullest possible extent (“Cambodia,”
n.d.). Furthermore, the emphasis on democratization can help decrease human rights abuses
through power-sharing as well as forcing leaders to be accountable to citizens by giving citizens
the right to vote abusive or potentially repressive leaders out of office. By laying the foundation
for a state with democratic principles, peacekeepers can ensure future respect for human rights,
as numerous studies have found democracies to be associated with a decrease in human rights
abuses (McKinlay and Cohan, 1975; Mitchell and McCormick, 1988; Henderson, 1991; Poe and
Tate, 1994; Davenport, 1995; Poe, Tate, and Keith, 1999; Davenport, 1999; Zanger, 2000;
Davenport and Armstrong, 2004).
However, as mentioned previously, negotiated settlements have been found to fail more
often than decisive victories, and part of the reason behind this involves the negative
consequences of political, economic, and military power-sharing. Survivors of civil wars must
decide how political and economic benefits will be divided throughout all parties to the conflict
and across the population at large. The incumbent government faces a significant cost in
redistributing the political and economic benefits it fought so hard to retain, to opponents who
have correspondently fought as hard to take full control of those benefits (Toft, 2010, p. 42-43).
Although peacekeepers actively seek to include all factions in the post-war state system, they
also tend to ‘freeze’ the military status quo when they arrive to intervene, which usually favors
the government. By not allowing a continuation of fighting, rebels are robbed of the opportunity
to win and change the system in their favor. This dissatisfaction with the antebellum status quo,
coupled with distributional problems, creates the potential for defection from the peace
settlement. As Werner and Yuen (2005) argue, durable settlements require distributional terms to
reflect belligerents’ convergent expectations about military consequences sans agreement. Even
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with democratization and free and fair elections, multidimensional missions cannot ensure
respect for future human rights if the foundations of the post-civil war state are viewed as
unrepresentative or if one side can easily be blocked from power with winner-take-all elections
or laws that can easily be changed (Walter, 1997, p. 362). Civil liberty restrictions could
additionally be employed by the majority to further eschew power from the group disadvantaged
at the time of the peace settlement. Minorities can still be victimized or have their rights
infringed upon if power is not distributed in a way that grants them enough influence to retain a
voice and sufficient economic income.
I hypothesize multidimensional missions to have a positive and significant impact on
respect for human rights, despite the potential for disruptions caused by the distributional
consequences of peacebuilding. The additional objectives of multidimensional mission mandates
over observer and traditional missions allow for peacekeepers to go beyond deterrence and
information transmissions to actively promote better human rights practices and install respectful
behavior into the state structure. Therefore, because multidimensional missions have elements of
peacemaking and peacebuilding through humanitarian objectives and building state structures to
respect human rights, I hypothesize multidimensional missions to be negative and significantly
related to human rights abuses in the present and future. Since multidimensional missions put
forth the most effort into ensuring the state will continue to make positive progress after the
mission is completed, I expect multidimensional missions to have the largest impacts on future
human rights performances. Also due to their peacebuilding nature, I hypothesize
multidimensional missions to have the largest effects on civil liberty rights.
Enforcement operations additionally go beyond simple monitoring and reporting by
helping to resolve the credible commitment problem of war-ending settlements through the use
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of force. These missions are generally authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and
include a significant military component to carry out large-scale combat operations. Chapter VII
of the UN Charter authorizes the Security Council to grant peacekeeping missions the right to
use force to maintain international peace and security (“Chapter VII,” 1945). While the other
types of peacekeeping operations generally obtain consent from all groups participating in the
cease-fire agreement, enforcement missions are not required to gain consent from all sides nor
obligated to depart if consent is withdrawn. The use of force can physically stop human rights
abuses or it can further deter belligerents from resorting to abusive behavior because they know
force will be used against them.
One of the major challenges to the success of war-ending agreements is the issue of
credible commitments, and enforcement missions can provide security guarantees to prevent a
lapse back into fighting. For a civil war to successfully end, combatants must lay down their
weapons and consolidate into a single state with a single military force. This means adversaries
make themselves vulnerable to exploitation if the opposing side does not follow through with
demobilizing or sharing power. Once groups surrender their weapons and/or occupied territory
they are unable to force the other side to comply with the terms of the agreement and unable to
protect themselves from attacks (Walter, 1999). Self-enforcement is especially difficult in
conflicts with strong distrust between combatants, multiple factions, substantial hostility, or lack
of coherent leadership (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000, p. 781). Therefore, a third party can
guarantee compliance for all groups by monitoring the situation and creating transparency about
everyone’s actions. Furthermore, enforcement missions can deter noncompliance by threatening
reneging groups with military action to force them to comply with the terms of the agreement or
forcefully restore public order. They can also provide protection should one side renege and
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attempt to attack an already demobilized group. Thus, peacekeepers raise the difficulty, and
therefore cost, of cheating so that it no longer exceeds the payoff of implementing the remaining
terms of the peace agreement. This makes “promises to cooperate gain credibility and
cooperation becomes more likely” (Walter, 1997, p. 340). Therefore, enforcement missions can
decrease the amount of human rights abuses that would have been suffered in their absence by
preventing a lapse back into fighting and deterring belligerent groups from using violence to
undermine peace agreements.
Numerous studies argue successful interventions require strong enforcement elements to
maintain security with a credible threat of force (Walter, 1997; Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild,
2001; Toft, 2010; Kathman and Wood, 2012). Enforcement missions are characterized by
significantly larger military elements than the other two types and can subsequently send a
stronger signal of resolve by the international community to conclude the civil war and raise the
political costs of ending the operation before its completion. Establishing enforcement missions
sends a signal to belligerents that the international community is committing itself not only to
forcefully securing the execution of a peace agreement but also to forcefully protecting civilians
(Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon, 2013a). Authorizing troops to use force to protect civilians
signals that the international community is deeply concerned about the welfare of the general
population, which increases pressure on combatants to avoid violence more than traditional or
multidimensional missions. Instead of potential future negative consequences in the form of
sanctions, loss of legitimacy, etc., violent belligerents face an immediate punishment of
retaliation by troops in the form of return fire. Moreover, soldiers can physically force reluctant
belligerents to demobilize and turn in their weapons, reducing their ability to target and harm
civilians. The authorization to use force further allows peacekeepers to create effective buffer
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zones to separate combatants in order to reduce disruptions to cease-fire agreements and to create
safe zones for civilians (Ibid., p. 879). Simultaneously, more personnel allows the operation to
protect civilians throughout the country and leaves it less restricted as compared to traditional
missions. Reaching larger swaths of the country and its inhabitants increases the operations’
ability to succeed and prevent abuses.
Furthermore, troops on the ground physically protect civilians and use force to stop
abusers from committing violence. Soldiers defend designated safe areas from attacks, patrol
villages for signs of violence or aggressors, silence deadly fire against civilians with
reciprocation, and apprehend suspected war criminals to be tried for humanitarian atrocities. In
addition, soldiers protect and aid humanitarian relief, which could help decrease the amount of
abuses suffered from a lack of necessary resources. For example, soldiers stop factions from
disrupting relief convoys by forcing belligerents to retreat or provide security detail for
protection. It can be argued sending soldiers to forcefully stop perpetrators from committing acts
of violence is preferable to economic sanctions. As stated previously, one of the deterrents
associated with the other types of peacekeeping missions is the potential for sanctions to be
placed on groups engaging in abusive behavior. Economic sanctions can sometimes result in
hurting the regular citizens of a country more than the affluent leaders who capitalize on the
available rents associated with sanctions. Peacekeeping soldiers can police countries torn apart
by civil wars and specifically target abusive perpetrators without causing large-scale
unintentional harm to innocent civilians (Lepard, 2002).
Even though enforcement missions are authorized to protect civilians and use force, it is
dubious whether they actually possess the credibility and strength required to deter belligerents
from resorting to violence. Walter (1997) states three conditions credible interveners must fulfill
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in order to effectively solve the credible-commitment problem: they must have self-interest in
executing their commitments, they must have sufficient resources and will to punish treaty
defectors, and they must be able to effectively demonstrate their resolve with costly signals (p.
340-341). If the Security Council cannot commit a sufficient amount of troops or resources to the
mission, then its ability to decrease human rights abuses diminishes. This echoes studies showing
that as troop size increases, the chance of war reoccurring decreases (Hultman, Kathman,
Shannon, 2013b) and the use of violence decreases (Kathman and Wood, 2012). Past
enforcement missions, though, have been criticized for their lack of resolve and resources. For
example, the United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM I and II) suffered from the
beginning, with troops and resources that were slow to arrive on the ground, and throughout with
unclear chains of command and poor communication and coordination between units and the
states involved. UNOSOM II failed when it withdrew all personnel after the United States and
Europeans withdrew troops due to widely publicized mission failures and troop deaths, which
left Somalis at the violent mercy of warring factions (Howard, 2008, p. 27-28). In addition,
reeling from the failure in Rwanda the UN authorized the largest peacekeeping force in its
history to help the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The sheer volume of
personnel from such a large dispersion of countries proved difficult to manage. Upwards of
18,000 troops from 51 countries proved impossible to configure into a unified and robust mission
to combat multiple warring factions and complete a complex mandate. The operation has
additionally run into problems relating to contradictions in its mandate. While aiming to protect
civilians, the operation is also essentially taking sides in the conflict by militarily supporting the
country’s armed force (FARDC), which has habitually targeted the civilian population for rape,
harassment, and homicide. Bosco Ntaganda, who has been convicted by the International
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Criminal Court for conscripting child soldiers, is also a member of FARDC, which contradicts
the mission’s goal to bring to justice those who commit humanitarian abuses (Clark, 2011).
Therefore, not only can enforcement missions suffer from a lack of resolve or resources
necessary to protect civilians, they can also be impeded by their superior size and complexity.
I hypothesize enforcement missions to also have a greater and more statistically
significant impact on human rights performances than observer and traditional missions, since
they have the authority to use force. However, as with observer and traditional missions, the
mechanisms through which they prevent and deter abusive behavior occur while troops are still
on the ground. Therefore, I do not expect them to have significant impacts on long term human
rights performances, as the deterrence effect for refraining from abusive behavior diminishes as
soldiers leave the country and the international community no longer retains a credible threat of
punishment if the newly constructed or reconstructed central authority of the state spirals into
engaging in repressive behavior. I also expect the negative characteristics of enforcement
missions to outweigh the positives in comparison to the negative and positive characteristics of
multidimensional missions, leading to a less significant and substantial effect for enforcement
missions. As previously mentioned, it is more pertinent for peacekeepers to stop physical abuses
than civil liberty rights abuses, and even though enforcement missions have grown in scope over
the years, they do not concentrate on peacebuilding for the post-war state system as much as
multidimensional missions. Therefore, since they do not actively work to incorporate civil rights
into countries’ political systems, I expect enforcement missions to have a substantially smaller
effect on civil liberty rights than multidimensional missions.
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IV. METHODOLOGY AND MEASUREMENTS
For this study I utilize data on all countries involved in a civil war and a UN
peacekeeping operation since 1976. To test the relationship between the three types of
peacekeeping operations and their effects on human rights performances after civil wars, I
constructed a panel dataset of one row per year (t) per country (i) from 1976 to 2012. For each
country, data starts at the onset of its civil war and ends ten years after the civil war ends or
troops for its peacekeeping operation left. Since peacekeeping operations are not sent to every
country involved in a civil war, I utilize the two-stage Heckman selection model to correct for
non-random selection. The first stage is a probit model estimating the probability of a UN
peacekeeping operation using a dichotomous indicator as the dependent variable. The results are
used in the second stage OLS model to assess the effects of peacekeeping on multiple measures
of states’ human rights performance. Since ‘human rights’ encompasses a plethora of privileges
and freedoms, I utilize multiple popular measures of human rights abuses as each takes into
account slightly different elements of the relatively broad term and codes abuses differently. The
five dependent variables measuring human rights performance are: physical integrity rights as
measured by the Political Terror Scales (PTS) from Amnesty International Reports, physical
integrity rights as measured by PTS from the U. S. Department of State’s Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices, the Civil Liberty Rights Index by Freedom House (FH), physical
integrity rights as measured by CIRI, and empowerment rights as measured by CIRI. The sample
consists of 57 countries with a history of civil war and 1,346 observations. This includes 24
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countries that have experienced a peacekeeping operation. To account for the likely nonindependence of observations from the same country, I applied country clustered standard errors.
Although Sambanis (2008) found the positive impacts of peacekeeping operations occur
mainly in the short term, measured by two years in the future, I expect some of the mechanisms
of peacekeeping to take time to effect change. Since multidimensional and enforcement missions
entail substantially more personnel and more complex mandates, their impacts on reducing
human rights abuses could take longer than the smaller and simpler traditional missions.
Therefore, I include measures for future impacts of peacekeeping operations. I assess impacts for
two years in the future and again for five years in the future. I chose two years following the
study by Sambanis (2008) and five years to test whether the impacts last longer than what his
results indicated. This makes fifteen models, each utilizing one of the five measures of human
rights as the dependent variable. The first five models measure current human rights
performances with the dependent and independent variables all measured in the same year, the
next five assess the effects of future human rights performances by lagging the independent
variables by two years, and the last five measure future impacts by lagging the independent
variables by five years.
Dates for each country’s civil war are taken from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program and
Peace Research Institute Oslo (UCDP/PRIO) Armed Conflict Dataset version 4-2013 (v.4-2013)
(Themnér and Wallensteen, 2014) and the Correlates of War Project (COW) Intra-State War
Data version 4.0 (v4.0) (Sarkees and Wayman, 2010). UCDP defines intra-state conflict as “a
contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force
between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25
battle-related deaths” per year and encompasses the time period 1946 to 2012 (Themnér, 2013, p.
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1). The COW database defines intra-state war as sustained combat between organized armed
forces, where parties can be state or non-state entities, that results in a minimum of 1,000 battlerelated combatant deaths per year and encompasses 1818-2007 (Sarkees, 2010). Though I
generally utilized the UCDP/PRIO dataset for the start and end dates of combat for each civil
war, I utilized either start or end dates from the COW for a few countries to reflect more
sustained combat due to the low minimum of required deaths per year for UCDP.
The first stage of the selection model includes six predictor variables. The dependent
variable is simply a dummy indicator for the presence of a UN peacekeeping operation. For the
independent variables I follow the guidance of previous studies on where UN peacekeepers are
sent. Fortna (2004; 2008) found consent-based peacekeeping is less likely after decisive victories
and more likely to intervene in countries with lower living standards, while Chapter VII missions
are more likely to be sent to less democratic states. Gilligan and Stedman (2003) found the UN is
more likely to intervene in wars with longer durations. Therefore, the first two independent
variables are dichotomous indicators of a decisive victory and any type of peace or war-ending
agreement. Information for both variables came from the COW Intra-State War Data v.4.0
(Sarkees and Wayman, 2010) and the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v.4-2013 (Themnér
and Wallensteen, 2014). Victory includes a war outcome with either the government or a rebel
group defeating its opponent. The agreement variable includes a war outcome by compromise
(COW) or a peace or ceasefire agreement (UCDP/PRIO). Since the original purpose of UN
peacekeeping operations was to monitor or enforce peace/ceasefire agreements, I expect war
agreements to be associated with the presence of peacekeeping. I expect decisive victories to be
negatively related to peacekeeping because victories can lead to more stable peace (Toft, 2010)
and because winners are unlikely to want international peacekeepers observing or interfering in
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the post-war treatment of the losing side or remaining internal threats (Fortna, 2008, p. 22).
Logged GDP per capita in constant US dollars and logged population size are collected from the
World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI, 2014). Data for regime type comes from
the Polity IV project and measures regimes from -10 (most autocratic) to 10 (most democratic)
(Marshall and Jaggers, 2011). The last predictor measures war duration and is simply the number
of years a country was engaged in a civil war. GDP, population size, regime type, and war
duration can influence the propensity of a return to war and might therefore influence whether
the UN Security Council deems it wise to send a mission. A low GDP or a high population size
could fuel economic grievances or make it hard for former combatants to find community jobs
and return to civilian life. Fully autocratic governments should be more unlikely to incorporate
all sides of a conflict into the post-war setup than governments with power-sharing mechanisms
already in place and might also be more averse to peacekeeping attempts to democratize since
they would have the most power to lose.
The second stage of the Heckman estimation tests the relationship of interest. The first
and second dependent variables, personal integrity rights, refer to the freedom from torture, cruel
and inhumane treatment, unlawful physical harm, forced disappearances, and unlawful
imprisonment. They are measured by the Political Terror Scales, with scores compiled from
Amnesty International’s annual human rights reports (PTS Amnesty) and the U.S. Department of
State’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (PTS US). Country information for both
reports is based on a scale from one to five that was originally developed by Freedom House and
with the time period 1976 to 2012 (Gibney, Cornett, Wood, and Haschke , 2014). A score of one
indicates that a state is operated under a secure rule of law where political murder, torture, or
imprisonment is exceptionally rare. A score of five indicates that the whole population
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experiences extensive and common imprisonment, executions, and unlimited detention with
leaders that “place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or
ideological goals” (Ibid.). The primary goal of these scales is to measure state sanctioned
political violence, although “coders are instructed not to turn a blind eye towards violence by
non-state actors” and use their best judgment for measuring civil war situations where state and
non-state violence in particular “often go together” (Ibid.).
Previous literature generally only examines the effects of physical integrity abuses;
however, human rights encompass civil freedoms as well as physical freedoms. Therefore, I
include two measures of civil liberty abuses. The first is the civil liberties index by Freedom
House (FH). It measures freedoms of expression and belief, associational and organizational
rights, rule of law, personal autonomy, the extent of equality, the amount of restrictions placed
on aspects of society such as the media or trade unions, and restrictions placed on economic
activity. The measure is largely based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the
United Nations and takes into account laws and actual implementation, as well as government
and non-government impediments to citizens’ freedoms. Their survey data includes analytical
reports and numerical ratings for all countries and territories on a scale of one to seven. The
ratings are based on fifteen survey questions grouped into four categories: freedom of
expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal
autonomy and individual rights. Scores from the previous year are taken into consideration, with
scores for years under review only changing for on-the-ground developments. A country with a
rating of one typically enjoys a wide range of civil liberties, has an established and fair rule of
law, allows for free economic activity, and generally seeks equal opportunity for all races and
genders. Countries with a score of seven have few or no civil liberties, allow for virtually no
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freedom of expression or association, do not protect the rights of prisoners or detainees, and
usually control economic activity (Freedom House, 2012). The data was obtained from the
Quality of Governance Dataset (version 20Dec13) and includes data from 1976 to 2012 (Teorell,
Charron, Dahlberg, Holmberg, Rothstein, Sundin & Svensson, 2013).
Both CIRI measures range from 1981 to 2011 and were taken from the Cingranelli and
Richards Human Rights Data Project (Cingranelli and Richards, 2014). The CIRI indexes only
measure the actual practices of governments and its agents towards its own citizens. Coders for
the index are also “forbidden to look at existing CIRI or other human rights scores for the
countries they are coding” (Cingranelli, Richards, and Clay, 2014). The CIRI Physical Integrity
Rights Index is a scale from zero to eight based on the use of torture, extrajudicial homicide,
political imprisonment, and forced disappearances. For this scale CIRI utilizes both the U.S.
Department of State and Amnesty International’s annual reports, although Amnesty reports were
used when the scores differed (Ibid.). A cumulative score of zero indicates a state has no respect
for physical integrity rights and an eight indicates that a state fully respects these rights. The
second civil liberties measure is the CIRI Empowerment Index, which is based on U.S.
Department of State Reports. It measures rights such as free speech, freedom of assembly and
association, freedom of religion, freedom of movement, women’s rights, political participation,
electoral self-determination, and workers’ rights. These scores are also cumulative and range
from zero to fourteen, with zero indicating no respect or adherence to these rights and fourteen
representing full respect and adherence (Murdie and Davis, 2010, p. 62). In order to interpret the
results easier I have flipped these scores to match the PTS and FH measures; therefore, low
scores represent respect for human rights and high scores indicate a high amount of abuses.
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In addition to each dependent variable including slightly different elements and practices
for scoring, each measure has different strengths and weaknesses. The PTS takes the range of
violence into account more than the CIRI indexes by scoring states based on who is targeted
within the population and the magnitude of violence relative to total population size. CIRI scores
do not reflect these distinctions and additionally computes overall measures from cumulative
scores of the component parts. For example, even if a country experiences widespread and
indiscriminant killings or torture but does not have many reports of forced disappearances or
political imprisonment, its cumulative score will be restrained (Wood and Gibney, 2010). While
PTS scores do not have this limitation, the subjective assessment coders place on abuses is
critiqued as reducing the reliability of the measure. CIRI creators maintain that the cumulative
coding schemes and numeric thresholds increase inter-coder reliability, and criticize both the
PTS and FH projects for failing to report reliability statistics (Cingranelli and Richards, 2010).
Even though these are but a few critiques of the measures, I decided there were enough overall
differences to include all five in order to get a more accurate and robust assessment of
peacekeeping impacts.
The independent variables of interest are the three groups of UN peacekeeping
operations. As explained above, the United Nations and subsequent literature classify four types
of peacekeeping operations; however, I combine two since they are more similar in scope than
the others. The first group contains both observational and traditional missions. These two
groups were classified as such if their mandates did not contain any authorization for the use of
force other than self-defense or major tasks other than monitoring and reporting. Traditional
missions do include minor tasks, though, as mentioned previously. The next type,
multidimensional, expands beyond the scope of the previous group and includes at least two
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major dimensions other than monitoring and reporting. Finally, enforcement missions include a
much larger military component with the authorization to use force under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter and are not required to have consent from both sides of belligerents in the conflict.
Classifications of these groups are based on data by Fortna (2008), Doyle and Sambanis (2006),
and the wording of mission mandates (Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2014). As for
the distribution of each mission type for the sample, traditional and enforcement missions tend to
last longer than multidimensional missions. Distributions for different types of missions and their
association with specific human rights scores tend to be more delineated by year than the level of
abuses.1
For control variables I utilized the top controls in both the human rights and
peacekeeping literature. The three most common controls in the human rights literature are
economic development, population size, and regime type. As economic benefits are dispersed
throughout a state, citizens are less likely to revolt due to scarcity or inequality and are more
likely to have the resources to combat repressive belligerents (Poe and Tate, 1994; Poe et al.,
1999; Richards, Gelleny, and Sacko, 2001). Therefore, I expect higher levels of economic
development to be associated with less human rights abuses. This variable is measured by logged
GDP per capita in constant US dollars from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators
(WDI, 2014). Data for (logged) population size is also collected from the WDI and has been
found to be associated with decreases in respect for human rights (Poe and Tate, 1994; Poe et al.,
1999). I expect an increase in population size to be correlated with an increase in human rights
violations. As population size increases, it could lead to a scarcity of resources creating revolts or
exacerbating the conditions typically associated with civil wars, and with more people there are
1

To see a distribution of the length of each mission type and its relation to human rights scores, please see the
appendix.
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simply more chances for violations (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, 2005). Democracy has been
correlated with better human rights practices; therefore, I expect democratic countries to have
less human rights abuses due to the political mechanisms conducive to more peaceful conflict
resolution. Democratic states are speculated to help human rights practices for numerous reasons,
such as: political freedoms, civilian control of the military, promotion of civil society, systems
of checks and balances that block repressive action, and the ability to vote coercive authorities
out of office (Poe et al., 1999; Murdie and Davis, 2012). Data for regime type comes from the
Polity IV project and measures regimes from -10 (most autocratic) to 10 (most democratic).
Institutional features that distinguish the two regime types include: competitiveness of the
process for chief executive selection, the openness of that process to social groups, the level of
institutional constraints on the chief executive’s authority for decision-making, competitiveness
of political participation, and the extent to which binding rules govern political participation.
In conjunction with the peacekeeping literature, it is also necessary to control for
variables that impact peacekeepers in relation to civil wars. Therefore, I include a measure of the
duration of the civil war. It is simply the number of years a country was engaged in war, which is
consistent with data compiled by Lacina and Gleditsch (2005) and used by Murdie and Davis
(2010). Obviously, the longer the conflict the more opportunities there are for human rights
abuses to occur; therefore, I expect an increase in this variable to be associated with an increase
in human rights abuses. There is a competing theory, however, regarding the duration of conflict.
As the length of conflict increases, it allows for information convergence between adversaries
and battle exhaustion. This can result in a more durable peace settlement and a reluctance to
engage in abusive behavior. Next, since the data includes observations during war and after the
war ends, I include a war count variable to delineate between war and post-war years. Civil war
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years are coded with zeros and post-war years are coded by the number of years since the war
ended. Finally, I include a variable measuring operation resources to control for differences in
the size of the three mission groups. Data for mission budgets is not as consistent or extensive as
data for mission personnel; therefore, I utilize a measure for personnel since it encompasses
yearly change. The number of military, police, and civilian personnel was collected from the
United Nations (“Troop and Police Contributors Archive,” 2013).2 I expect greater resources to
correlate with less human right abuses, as those missions will have greater means and
opportunities to effect positive change. However, since previous studies have established
peacekeeping missions are sent to the “harder” conflicts, missions with more personnel may
correlate with worse human rights performances simply because they are sent to areas where
more abuses are occurring.

2

Ideally, I want a measure of personnel that includes as much of a civilian component as police and military, such
as election organizers, training experts, and volunteers. Unfortunately, there was not as much comprehensive
yearly data for civilians, so this variable should be taken with caution as it disadvantages the impacts of
multidimensional mission personnel.
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V. EMPIRICAL ANALYSES
The statistical analysis indicates that the different types of peacekeeping operations do
impact human rights performances differently. Table 1 displays the results of current impacts on
human rights performances by peacekeeping operations. Table 2 displays the results of future
performances as measured by two years, and Table 3 displays the results for five years in the
future. For each model, traditional missions are the reference category. All models meet a
minimum goodness of fit to the population; however, the results should be taken with caution
due to a limited number of multidimensional mission-years. Most models also demonstrate that
the relationship between human rights performance and peacekeeping missions is best modeled
as a selection process. The parameter rho (ߩ) reports the correlation between the errors of the
first and second stages. Statistical significance reveals that testing the relationship between
human rights and peacekeeping in a one-stage model would yield biased results. A few models,
however, do not achieve a significant rho (most notably models including the FH civil liberties
and CIRI empowerment variables as the second stage dependent variables) and thus may not
require a selection model. As an additional variable, I originally included a yearly measure for
battle-related deaths in conjunction with peacekeeping literature. Data for logged battle deaths
was taken from the PRIO Battle Deaths Dataset version 3.0 (Lacina and Gleditsch, 2005), which
was designed for use with the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 4.0 (Lacina and
Gleditsch, 2005), and for a few instances of missing data I supplemented numbers from the
UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset version 5-2013 (“UCDP,” 2013). However, the variable
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restricted the sample below an acceptable amount of observations. I then used the same data to
construct a measure for total battle-related deaths for each conflict; however, I ultimately left this
variable out of the final equation because it never achieved significance and did not significantly
change any of the results in an already restricted sample.
The bottom portion of each table reports the selection (first) stage probit estimation
results. The three tables indicate that victories, agreements, and population size significantly
predict whether a country experiences a peacekeeping mission. Interestingly, both victories and
agreements are consistently negative. This means that the probability of a country experiencing a
peacekeeping mission decreases with a victory or an agreement. Population size, although less
significant, is additionally negative. Thus, the models predict that as a country’s population
increases, its probability of having a mission decreases. Therefore, countries are not likely to
receive peacekeeping operations if their civil war ends with a victory, an agreement, or if they
have a large population. While not significant, the other variables indicate that countries with
higher GDPs, more democratic governments, and longer wars also have low probabilities of
experiencing UN peacekeeping.
For the second stage OLS estimation, and relationship between human rights and the
three types of peacekeeping missions, Table 1 indicates that there are somewhat mixed results
between traditional missions and the other two groups for the amount of current human rights
abuses. Model 1 indicates that enforcement missions are associated with more physical integrity
abuses than traditional missions, and on average score about 0.71 points higher on the PTS scale.
Model 4, however, indicates multidimensional missions are significantly associated with less
physical integrity abuses. When controlling for the other variables, multidimensional missions on
average score 1.49 points lower than traditional missions on the CIRI index. Analyzing the
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Table 1: Effects of Peacekeeping on Current Human Rights Scores
Human Rights
Scores: Second Stage

Model 1
PTS
Amnesty
0.23
(0.28)

Model 2
PTS
US
-0.12
(0.29)

Model 3
FH Civil
Liberties
-0.34
(0.31)

Model 4
CIRI
PIR
-1.49***
(0.57)

Model 5
CIRI Empower

Enforcement

0.71**
(0.30)

0.03
(0.31)

0.01
(0.28)

-0.72
(0.80)

1.70
(1.04)

(Log) GDP

-0.16
(0.14)

-0.23**
(0.11)

-0.54***
(0.08)

-0.97***
(0.18)

-0.33
(0.31)

(Log) Population

-0.12
(0.16)

-0.17
(0.15)

0.55***
(0.13)

0.79**
(0.35)

1.76***
(0.54)

Regime Type

-0.05
(0.03)

-0.05**
(0.02)

-0.08***
(0.02)

-0.05
(0.04)

-0.24***
(0.08)

War Duration

0.03
(0.03)

0.03
(0.02)

0.01
(0.02)

-0.01
(0.04)

0.02
(0.06)

War Count

-0.08**
(0.04)

-0.08**
(0.03)

-0.09***
(0.02)

-0.14**
(0.06)

-0.08
(0.06)

(Log) PK Personnel

-0.08
(0.07)
5.09**
(2.38)

0.01
(0.06)
6.55***
(2.17)

-0.01
(0.06)
-0.43
(2.15)

-0.09
(0.16)
-2.14
(5.27)

-0.40**
(0.18)
-17.89**
(8.00)

-0.73***
(0.25)

-0.75***
(0.23)

-0.66**
(0.27)

-0.75***
(0.26)

-0.66**
(0.27)

Agreement

-0.50**
(0.26)

-0.63**
(0.28)

-0.47*
(0.27)

-0.64**
(0.29)

-0.59**
(0.29)

(Log) GDP

-0.16
(0.13)

-0.17
(0.13)

-0.16
(0.13)

-0.13
(0.12)

-0.13
(0.13)

(Log) Population

-0.21*
(0.11)

-0.21*
(0.12)

-0.20*
(0.11)

-0.21*
(0.11)

-0.21*
(0.11)

Regime Type

-0.01
(0.03)

-0.01
(0.03)

-0.01
(0.03)

-0.01
(0.03)

-0.01
(0.03)

Duration

-0.01
(0.02)

-0.01
(0.02)

-0.02
(0.02)

-0.01
(0.02)

-0.01
(0.02)

Constant

3.78**
(1.87)

3.95**
(1.84)

3.70**
(1.83)

3.58**
(1.74)

3.49**
(1.77)

 (rho)

1.18***
(0.36)

1.12***
(0.26)

0.42
(0.31)

0.95***
(0.29)

0.45
(0.47)

Wald Test (=0)
۱ܑܐ (1)
Observations

10.40***

18.89***

1.85

10.52***

0.92

154

158

159

145

145

Multidimensional

Constant
Peacekeeping:
Selection Stage
Victory

Note:

Country clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Statistical significance at
*p≤ 0.10; **p≤ 0.05; ***p≤0.01
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-0.40
(1.17)

differences between multidimensional and enforcement missions yields only two statistically
significant coefficients. With PTS Amnesty as the dependent variable, multidimensional
missions on average score about 0.48 points lower on the human rights scale with a p-value of
0.08. With the CIRI Empowerment Index, multidimensional missions average about 2.10 points
lower than enforcement missions with a p-value of 0.01. Hence, multidimensional missions are
associated with fewer abuses than enforcement missions. While it is unexpected that
enforcement missions coincide with more abuses than traditional missions, the table does lend
some support to my hypotheses that multidimensional missions are associated with less human
rights abuses than traditional and enforcement missions. These assertions are tentative, though,
because only a few statistics achieved significance out of five human rights measures.
Furthermore, these results also favor physical integrity rights. Civil liberties largely do not seem
to be affected differently between the three mission types. Only one of the FH and CIRI
empowerment measures yielded a significant coefficient for the mission variables. Both
measures additionally fail to achieve a significant rho and fail the Wald Test, meaning the
correlation of errors in the two stages may be zero.
Table 2 demonstrates that differences between the three mission types are slightly less
significant for two years in the future. The CIRI physical integrity rights measure is the only
human rights measure to gain significance, and indicates that multidimensional missions are still
associated with fewer rights abuses than traditional missions. Multidimensional missions on
average score about 1.50 points lower than traditional missions. These results should be taken
with caution, though, since both CIRI indexes and the FH measure do not have significant rhos
and fail the Wald test. While all models again had negative coefficients for multidimensional
missions in comparison to enforcement missions, only the same two dependent variables
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Table 2: Human Rights Abuse Scores for Two Years in the Future
Human Rights
Scores: Second Stage

Model 1
PTS
Amnesty
-0.34
(0.45)

Model 2
PTS
US
-0.49
(0.36)

Model 3
FH Civil
Liberties
-0.45
(0.44)

Model 4
CIRI
PIR
-1.50**
(0.74)

Model 5
CIRI Empower

Enforcement

0.29
(0.41)

-0.22
(0.29)

0.05
(0.31)

-0.92
(0.70)

0.29
(0.93)

(Log) GDP

-0.17
(0.15)

-0.32**
(0.14)

-0.53***
(0.12)

-0.94***
(0.23)

-0.02
(0.27)

(Log) Population

-0.17
(0.18)

-0.20
(0.16)

0.38*
(0.20)

0.86**
(0.42)

1.83***
(0.58)

Regime Type

-0.01
(0.04)

-0.02
(0.03)

-0.07**
(0.03)

-0.004
(0.05)

-0.23***
(0.09)

War Duration

0.04
(0.03)

0.03
(0.03)

0.003
(0.03)

0.002
(0.05)

0.04
(0.06)

War Count

-0.03
(0.03)

-0.03
(0.03)

-0.06***
(0.02)

-0.10**
(0.05)

-0.09
(0.09)

(Log) PK Personnel

-0.02
(0.08)
4.72*
(2.74)

0.05
(0.04)
6.47***
(2.45)

-0.04
(0.06)
1.08
(2.82)

-0.12
(0.12)
-3.61
(5.48)

-0.25*
(0.14)
-17.70**
(8.62)

-0.44**
(0.20)

-0.53***
(0.19)

-0.52**
(0.21)

-0.41
(0.45)

-0.67***
(0.26)

Agreement

-0.45**
(0.22)

-0.52**
(0.22)

-0.35
(0.22)

-0.45*
(0.26)

-0.36
(0.28)

(Log) GDP

-0.15
(0.13)

-0.15
(0.13)

-0.13
(0.14)

-0.16
(0.14)

-0.17
(0.13)

(Log) Population

-0.21*
(0.11)

-0.20*
(0.12)

-0.20*
(0.11)

-0.20*
(0.11)

-0.20*
(0.11)

Regime Type

-0.01
(0.03)

-0.01
(0.03)

-0.01
(0.03)

-0.005
(0.03)

-0.01
(0.03)

War Duration

-0.02
(0.02)

-0.02
(0.02)

-0.02
(0.02)

-0.02
(0.02)

-0.02
(0.02)

Constant

3.75**
(1.79)

3.62**
(1.80)

3.41*
(1.92)

3.63**
(1.75)

3.62**
(1.74)

 (rho)

1.56***
(0.53)

1.48***
(0.30)

1.28
(0.83)

0.89
(1.31)

-0.89
(0.77)

Wald Test (=0)
۱ܑܐ (1)
Observations

8.74***

24.04***

2.38

0.46

1.35

157

159

158

144

144

Multidimensional

Constant
Peacekeeping:
Selection Stage
Victory

Note:

Country clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Statistical significance at
*p≤ 0.10; **p≤ 0.05; ***p≤0.01
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-1.65
(1.17)

indicated a significant difference. Multidimensional missions score about 0.62 less than
enforcement missions on the PTS Amnesty scale and about 1.94 points lower on the CIRI
Empowerment Index, both with a 90% confidence level. Thus, although Models 3-5 should be
taken with caution, the table again suggests multidimensional missions are associated with fewer
abuses than traditional and enforcement missions.
Table 3 indicates that the effects of the different types of peacekeeping on human rights
take time. The differences between the three groups have increased for scores five years in the
future. While the model containing the FH civil liberties measure again fails to achieve a
significant rho, every other human rights measure reveals a statistically significant difference
between the three mission types. In comparison to traditional missions, multidimensional
missions consistently score significantly lower on physical integrity rights scales and the
empowerment rights scale. In Models 1 and 2, multidimensional missions on average score 0.94
and 0.64 points lower than traditional missions for the PTS scales and 1.45 and 3.91 points lower
on the CIRI indexes, respectively. While enforcement missions only achieve significance in
relation to the PTS Amnesty dependent variable, Model 1 indicates that they score about 0.69
points lower than traditional missions. Even though the statistic only achieves a 90% confidence
level, it is the first result indicating enforcement missions are associated with fewer abuses than
traditional missions. In conjunction with the previous two tables, there is also a difference
between multidimensional and enforcement missions. With PTS Amnesty as the dependent
variable, multidimensional missions on average score about 0.26 points less than enforcement
missions. For PTS US, multidimensional missions score 0.51 points lower, both with a p-value
of 0.09. In Model 5, multidimensional missions score about 2.98 points lower on the CIRI
Empowerment Index with a p-value of 0.001. These results suggest that there is a larger
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Table 3: Human Rights Abuse Scores for Five Years in the Future
Human Rights
Scores: Second Stage

Model 1
PTS
Amnesty
-0.94**
(0.41)

Model 2
PTS
US
-0.64*
(0.37)

Model 3
FH Civil
Liberties
-0.19
(0.46)

Model 4
CIRI
PIR
-1.45**
(0.70)

Model 5
CIRI Empower

Enforcement

-0.69*
(0.42)

-0.14
(0.36)

-0.10
(0.50)

-0.46
(0.69)

-0.94
(0.79)

(Log) GDP

-0.40
(0.28)

-0.30
(0.19)

-0.29
(0.19)

-0.85**
(0.42)

-0.14
(0.42)

(Log) Population

-0.43
(0.27)

-0.17
(0.16)

0.46*
(0.26)

0.69
(0.45)

1.30***
(0.40)

Regime Type

0.03
(0.05)

0.01
(0.03)

-0.03
(0.04)

0.08
(0.07)

-0.17**
(0.08)

War Duration

0.01
(0.04)

0.02
(0.04)

0.02
(0.02)

0.02
(0.06)

0.02
(0.05)

War Count

0.06***
(0.004)

-0.004
(0.02)

-0.004
(0.04)

-0.07
(0.05)

-0.03
(0.07)

(Log) PK Personnel

0.08
(0.09)
8.79**
(4.14)

-0.01
(0.06)
5.65**
(2.60)

-0.06
(0.07)
-0.75
(4.19)

-0.14
(0.10)
-3.82
(7.42)

-0.02
(0.13)
-8.98
(6.78)

-0.19**
(0.09)

-0.45**
(0.20)

-0.63**
(0.27)

-0.51**
(0.21)

-0.50*
(0.26)

Agreement

-0.36**
(0.14)

-0.35*
(0.20)

-0.44*
(0.26)

-0.18
(0.26)

-0.25
(0.26)

(Log) GDP

-0.13
(0.12)

-0.14
(0.12)

-0.16
(0.14)

-0.17
(0.13)

-0.19
(0.13)

(Log) Population

-0.18*
(0.11)

-0.18*
(0.11)

-0.20*
(0.11)

-0.18*
(0.11)

-0.18*
(0.11)

Regime Type

-0.01
(0.03)

-0.01
(0.03)

-0.01
(0.03)

-0.002
(0.03)

-0.002
(0.03)

War Duration

-0.02
(0.02)

-0.02
(0.02)

-0.02
(0.02)

-0.02
(0.02)

-0.02
(0.02)

Constant

3.11*
(1.69)

3.24*
(1.72)

3.67**
(1.84)

3.25*
(1.68)

3.35**
(1.70)

 (rho)

3.24***
(0.41)

1.71***
(0.27)

0.16
(0.56)

1.48***
(0.51)

-1.08*
(0.63)

Wald Test (=0)
۱ܑܐ (1)
Observations

61.52***

35.37***

0.09

8.48***

2.96*

155

157

157

128

129

Multidimensional

Constant
Peacekeeping:
Selection Stage
Victory

Note: Country clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Statistical significance at
*p≤ 0.10; **p≤ 0.05; ***p≤0.01
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-3.91***
(0.87)

difference in the contributions of each type of mission five years in the future, and that
multidimensional missions in particular may have more lasting effects. To investigate any further
future effects, I ran additional regressions for scores eight and ten years in the future.
Unfortunately, every single model fails to achieve a significant rho, Wald test, and/or goodness
of fit to the population. Hence, the results imply that the effects of peacekeeping generally have
short term contributions, as found by Sambanis (2008), but the impacts wane after about five
years instead of two.
The controls generally follow expectations. An increase in GDP per capita is associated
with a decrease in human rights abuses across all models. The impacts of population size are
dubious, as almost every significant result occurs in models that fail the Wald test. However, all
significant coefficients imply that as population size increases, the amount of human rights
abuses increase. The effects of regime type tend to decrease over time, although the models
indicate that more democratic countries have fewer abuses. War duration is surprisingly
insignificant, with no statistical significance in any model. The variable is consistently positive
though, suggesting longer wars are associated with more rights violations. The war count
variable measuring the amount of time since the end of the civil war generally indicates that as
the amount of time since the war’s end increases, the amount of human rights abuses decrease. It
follows expectations that more rights violations occur during war and gradually decrease in the
following years. The variable measuring the number of personnel participating in peacekeeping
missions is only significant in two models that both fail the Wald test. Therefore, taken with
caution, Tables 1 and 2 indicate that as the number of personnel increases, the amount of
empowerment rights abuses decrease. It is unexpected that this variable only significantly
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impacts empowerment rights and not physical integrity rights, as soldiers and police would be
expected to deter physical abuses over civil liberty abuses.
Of special note is the consistent difference between the physical integrity rights measures
and the civil liberties measures, as the models suggest selection bias is a problem with physical
integrity rights but not necessarily for the empowerment or civil liberties measures. Across all
three tables, none of the models with either the Freedom House Civil Liberty Index or the CIRI
Empowerment Index as the dependent variable achieves a significant rho or passes the Wald test
with a 95% confidence level. This implies that the relationship between civil liberties and
peacekeeping missions may not require a two-stage selection process. This makes it difficult to
interpret peacekeeping effects on civil liberty rights and hence draw inferences on this aspect of
human rights, though it could indicate that these types of rights are affected less by peacekeeping
operations in general than the more physically abusive rights.
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VI. CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
In general, the results suggest that there are some differences in the impacts of
peacekeeping operations. Although the results should be taken with caution, as explained
previously, they indicate multidimensional missions are more effective in reducing human rights
abuses than traditional and enforcement missions for current and future rights. The analysis also
provides evidence that there is a time lag in some of the peacekeeping mechanisms that impact
rights abuses, most surprisingly for enforcement missions. For current rights, enforcement
missions are associated with more abuses than traditional missions, which is against my
hypotheses. However, for five years in the future, enforcement missions are associated with
fewer abuses. Even though there is less significant difference than expected, the results could
imply that traditional missions may affect more change in the present since it easier to operate
with smaller mandate objectives and less personnel, while enforcement missions entail
substantially more personnel. It logically follows that those missions would take longer to
coordinate and implement activities across war-torn countries. After all, coordinating thousands
of troops that all speak different languages to forcefully protect civilians would naturally take
longer than dispensing smaller groups of soldiers to simply observe activities.
The results further suggest that it might be more productive for the UN to invest in
multidimensional missions as opposed to enforcement missions. Although there was again less
significance than expected, states with multidimensional missions demonstrated lower scores
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than states with enforcement missions for current and future practices. It is unexpected that more
rights measures did not correspond with significant and substantive differences between the two
mission types. With significant effort invested in peacebuilding for multidimensional missions,
and the deterrent impacts of enforcement missions confined to when troops are still in-country, it
could demonstrate that enforcement missions have lasting affects unaccounted for by this paper.
However, this is most likely due to significant overlap in enforcement mission mandates. For
multiple operations, the Security Council updated mandates as they deemed necessary for the
situation on the ground. This led to multiple multidimensional operations shifting into
enforcement missions when the Security Council deemed Chapter VII status to be appropriate
for deteriorating or lasting violence. For several states, this left mandates and resources
continuing to pursue multidimensional peacebuilding in conjunction with larger military
campaigns. Therefore, since multiple mission-years could be classified as both multidimensional
and enforcement, the overlap could account for insignificant differences between the two.
Alternatively, it could suggest that the mechanisms for decreasing abuses for the two types offset each other, as Walter (1997) found that the peacebuilding measures of multidimensional
missions can off-set security guarantees without the substantial military component of
enforcement missions.
Future studies could improve these findings by better controlling for endogeneity in
which mission types are approved for which types of situations. Are peacekeepers decreasing the
amount of human rights abuses, or are the levels of abuses dictating the types of peacekeeping
operations deployed? While the Security Council’s decision to send peacekeeping operations
suffers from selection bias, so too does its decision for the type of force sent. This is especially
true considering the Security Council has been more willing to authorize the use of force for
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enforcement missions in the past two decades, whereas before they mainly sent traditional
missions to maintain the policies of consent and neutrality. There are also several instances
where the Security Council has “upgraded” or “downgraded” missions to reflect changes in the
situation on the ground. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to address this selection
bias, future studies could test the robustness of this paper’s results by accounting for the selection
into different types of peacekeeping missions. Also, it would be advantageous to know the
change in countries’ human rights scores after the war as compared to before the war, in
comparison to countries’ scores before and after civil wars without peacekeepers. That way,
researchers might get a clearer picture of the overall effects of peacekeeping.
Future studies could additionally find a better measure of human rights for this topic. The
five scales used for this project mainly measure abuses committed by the government. During
civil wars, though, the government is not the only group capable of carrying out large-scale
violence or the only group that can be affected by peacekeepers and their international attention.
It would make a more comprehensive study if the dependent variable thoroughly captured abuses
being committed by all groups involved in the civil war, both governmental and oppositional.
Despite the possible improvements to this study, the results suggest peacekeeping
operations do impact the human rights abuses associated with civil wars. If the results persist
through different statistical techniques and control variables, it could indicate that the larger and
more comprehensive multidimensional and enforcement missions are necessary to reduce future
rights abuses, but that smaller traditional missions are capable of enacting positive change for the
present. It could also indicate that analyses of success or failure in future peacekeeping studies
should encompass more than whether any party reneged on cease-fire agreements or whether the
operations created a more lasting peace. The treatment of the population is important also and
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should be taken into consideration when evaluating UN missions. Furthermore, studying the
different types of missions is important as each type has different strengths and weaknesses.
Analyzing which aspects of peacekeeping missions prevent or deter violence could help
peacekeepers be as effective as possible in carrying out the humanitarian and security aspects of
their mandates and in ensuring the establishment of a stable and respectful state for post-war
peace. Due to the duration and amount of devastation of civil wars, it is important to continue
studying factors that could decrease human rights abuses during and after these conflicts to help
spare innocents from the pain and suffering inflicted by combatants.
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